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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether price dynamics is homogeneous across
the Eurozone countries. Relying on monthly data over the January 1970-July 2011 pe-
riod, we test for the absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis through the
implementation of second-generation panel unit root and cointegration tests. Our results
show that price dynamics are heterogeneous depending on both the time period and the
considered group of countries. More speciﬁcally, while PPP is validated for the core EMU
countries, this hypothesis does not hold for Northern peripheral economies. Turning to
the Southern countries, PPP is observed only before the launch of the euro.
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Since 2009, EMU is experiencing serious economic troubles that now challenge its stability,
and, to a certain extent, even its existence. Triggered by high debt ratios relative to GDP,
high deﬁcits, and low growth expectations, a sovereign debt crisis has arisen in peripheral
countries. Greece, Ireland and Portugal have been forced to ask the Troïka1 for ﬁnancial as-
sistance, while Spain, even if it has succeeded to avoid such assistance, has experienced a large
increase in its debt ﬁnancing costs. The crisis has also reached the core of EMU, as evidenced
by the large increase of spreads between Italian and German bonds, and, to a lesser extent,
between French and German bonds.
If the roots of such a crisis are obviously multiple, one of the main reason would be the possi-
ble heterogeneity of price dynamics among members. In order to constitute a viable currency
area, the founding members of Eurozone have developed, since the beginning of the EMU, a
number of rules to ensure economic convergence, as stated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992)
completed by the Pact of Stability and Growth (1997). One of the crucial rules is surely
price stability: members’ inﬂation rates should not exceed by at most 1.5 points the mean
of the three lowest inﬂation rates. Although this is intended to render the “one-size-ﬁts-all”
monetary policy eﬃcient, it also has consequences on the price dynamics that may diﬀer with
the reality of the EMU.
Inside a monetary union, implementing the convergence of inﬂation rates is intended to avoid
asymmetric disequilibria coming from a loss of price competitiveness. However, it also sup-
poses strong economic homogeneity regarding per capita income and productivity levels. More
importantly, inﬂation rates convergence in a monetary union also implies price levels to be
close to those determined by the absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis.
Such a constraint may be viewed as very strong given the economic diﬀerences between the
core of EMU and the periphery. Balassa-Samuelson phenomena inducing price catching-up
1Namely, EU, ECB, and IMF.
2are expected in peripheral countries, leading to heterogeneous convergence speeds depending
on the group of countries—the extreme case being non convergence of price levels—and chal-
lenging absolute (and hence relative) PPP. In that case, common monetary policy may be
inadequate because of its pro-cyclicality. On one hand, it could be too restrictive for advanced
economies, and lead to deﬂationary pressures. On the other hand, it could be too incentive
for countries experiencing a catching-up: because of negative or low real interest rates, debt
bubbles may appear, conducting to worsen internal imbalances (excess leverage, asset price
bubbles), and external deﬁcits. Testing for absolute price convergence would allow us to in-
vestigate whether these processes may have materialized after the launch of the euro, partly
conducting to the sovereign debt crisis.
Only a few papers deal with price convergence inside the EMU. Articles generally focus on the
reasons explaining heterogeneity in inﬂation rates (see for example Engel and Rogers (2001),
Honohan and Lane (2003), or Arnold and Verhoef (2004)), but very few investigate price dy-
namics empirically (i.e. validation of absolute PPP), mainly because of the lack of available
data. The diﬀerences between the existing studies come from the datasets used. Some rely on
microdata—Engel and Rogers (2004), Crucini et al. (2005) and Rogers (2007)—while others
use aggregate data—Camarero et al. (2000), Allington et al. (2005), or Faber and Stockman
(2009).
Among the studies using microdata panels, Engel and Rogers (2004) and Rogers (2007) con-
sider data from the Economic Intelligence Unit and pay attention to the price of “standard”
goods measured in 18 cities belonging to the Eurozone. They ﬁnd a reduction of price dis-
persion during the implementation of the Single Act (1986), but the introduction of the euro
seems to have had little eﬀect. Crucini et al. (2005) test the validity of LOOP (Law Of One
Price) using Eurostat data for four diﬀerent years (1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990). They show
that LOOP is violated only for a little numbers of products, tending to validate absolute PPP.
Studies using aggregate data provide results that go in the same direction. Camarero et al.
3(2000) evidence a catching-up eﬀect for peripheral countries (Spain, Italy, and UK) relative
to Germany, by implementing time series unit root tests with structural breaks on CPI dif-
ferentials.2 Allington et al. (2005), employing Comparative Price Levels (CPLs) provided by
Eurostat, put forward a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the euro on price dispersion. By recalculating
CPIs that account for price level diﬀerentials between countries, Faber and Stockman (2009)
uphold the diminution in price dispersion across Eurozone countries. Finally, Guerreiro and
Mignon (2011) highlight some heterogeneity across the Eurozone members in terms of price
convergence speed, that can be explained by the evolution of price competitiveness, rigidities
on the labor market and technological specialization patterns.
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this literature that is still in its infancy by in-
vestigating the homogeneity of price dynamics inside EMU over the January 1970 to July
2011 period. We show that to respect price stability—and hence keep the monetary union
viable—one of the conditions lies in the achievement of absolute PPP. Therefore, to investigate
price convergence we rely on unit root and cointegration tests. We go further than the usual
time series and panel tests by accounting for both heterogeneity and cross-section dependence
through the implementation of second-generation panel unit root tests. We also assess speeds
of price convergence using the Pooled Mean Group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran, Smith and
Shin (1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and
the data. Section 3 displays the results of unit root tests and PMG estimates, while Section
4 discusses our ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes the article.
2We will evidence in Section 2 that this methodology is very questionable since CPI do not account for
diﬀerences in price levels.
42 Theoretical backgrounds and data
2.1 Theoretical backgrounds
In a two-countries model, absolute PPP is deﬁned by:
et = pt − p∗
t (1)
where et is the log of the spot exchange rate, and pt and p∗
t respectively denote the log of the
domestic and foreign price levels. Relative PPP holds when:
∆et = ∆pt − ∆p∗
t (2)
with ∆et denoting the variation of the log of the exchange rate, ∆pt and ∆p∗
t the inﬂation
rates of domestic and foreign country. If we assume now that these countries form a monetary
union with a single currency, et = 0, and it comes for absolute PPP:
pt − p∗
t = 0 (3)
while relative PPP becomes:
∆pt − ∆p∗
t = 0 (4)
Plugging (3) and (4), we get :
pt − p∗
t = ∆pt − ∆p∗
t (5)
Consequently, in a monetary union, absolute and relative PPP are equivalent. In other words,
convergence in inﬂation rates is conditioned by the fact that price levels are the same between
countries. If price levels diﬀer, the viability of the monetary area is challenged on the long
run. Countries that have lower price levels are expected to catch-up their delay (Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect), leading to higher inﬂation rates which goes against relative PPP inside a
5currency union. In a highly integrated currency union where trade barriers have disappeared,
and assuming that the adjustment towards absolute PPP is made only through the goods
market, a violation of absolute PPP “signals an imbalance in the goods markets which [...]
is likely to result in trade deﬁcits” (Juselius (2003)). Capital inﬂows (thanks to borrowing)
are necessary to recover the equilibrium of the balance of payments. However, these massive
inﬂows pressure upward nominal interest rates of low price countries leading to an increase
of the spreads relative to high price level countries. Accumulation of deﬁcits also leads to an
increase of the debt level which in turns raises the risk premium that traduces the default risk.
The combined eﬀect of these two mechanisms—that reveals the mistrust to currency union
viability—entails prohibitive ﬁnancing rates, conducting to a sovereign debt crisis that spills
over the union. This can be seen as a pure asymmetric shock as that presented by Mundell
(1961) in the seminal paper on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), that challenges the existence
of the currency union.
2.2 Data
To test for absolute PPP, price levels of Eurozone countries are needed. CPIs are unusable
since they do not account for price level diﬀerentials between countries: they only depict
the evolution of prices. To overcome this issue, we rely on the International Comparison
Program (ICP) carried by the World Bank that aims at providing comparable international
prices. Based on this framework, Eurostat and OECD have computed Comparative Price
Level (CPL) series for each European country. These CPLs are deﬁned by the OECD as the
ratio between purchasing power parity conversion factor for private consumption3 and the
nominal exchange rate. This ratio measures price level diﬀerences between two countries (in
our case between a European country and the United States) and can be expressed as follows:
3Following the World Bank deﬁnition, the PPP conversion factor for private consumption is the number of
units of a country’s currency required to buy the same amount of goods and services in the domestic market





where PPPi,t stands for the PPP conversion factor for private ﬁnal consumption of country
i relative to the United States at time t, expressed in euros per US dollar, and NERi,t is
the euro/dollar exchange rate at time t. Turning to data availability, CPLs are computed
by Eurostat and OECD for each European country annually only since 1995. It is however
possible to recover observations previous to 1995 using the price evolution relative to the
US in each European country—i.e. using the relative CPIs corrected by the exchange rate
variations. More speciﬁcally, we construct the monthly domestic price level series of country












where i = 1,...,12 denotes the European country. PPPi,2005 is the PPP for private consump-
tion for country i relative to the US in 2005 (euros per US dollar). CPIi,t, CPIi,2005, CPIUS,t
and CPIUS,2005 are respectively the country i’s CPI at time t and at year 2005, and the US
CPI at time t and at year 2005. NERi,2005 is the euro/dollar exchange rate in year 2005. 2005
has been chosen as the basis year because it corresponds to the year of the last ICP survey
realized by the World Bank.5 From Equation (7), we thus obtain 12 series of price levels 6 that
can be used to test for price convergence (see Figure 1 in Appendix). Given the importance
of Germany in the Eurozone, we retain this country as the benchmark, and investigate PPP
between each domestic price level series and the German one.7
4See Guerreiro and Mignon (2011). Note that to construct the price level series, it is assumed that the
reference goods basket has remained the same over the 1970-1995 period.
5PPP series are extracted from the OECD database. NER and CPI series are from IFS, except the German
and the Irish CPIs that come from Datastream.
6Note that since our price levels have a common benchmark, the US, our series already account for nominal
exchange-rate variations.
7In a previous version of the paper, a Eurozone price series was constructed, and PPP was investigated
between each domestic price level series and the aggregate price level series of the 11 respective partners.
The results were similar to those reported here, illustrating the robustness of our results to the choice of the
73 Tests and estimation results
3.1 Time series analysis
To assess PPP between each Eurozone member and Germany, we rely on unit root and coin-
tegration techniques by estimating an ADF-type equation:8
∆xt = k + φxt−1 +
p X
i=1
φi∆xt−i + t (8)
where xt denotes the diﬀerential between domestic (Pt) and German (P∗
t ) prices (in logs):
xt = lnPt − lnP∗
t (9)
When the null hypothesis φ = 0 in Equation (8) is rejected, the price diﬀerential is non-
stationary, meaning that PPP does not hold. In the case where the null is rejected, it is
possible to calculate the half-life of deviations (−ln(2)/ln(1 + φ)) which provides an indica-
tion regarding the speed of price mean reversion.
As evidenced by the typology of Balassa (1961), monetary union is supposed to be the ﬁnal
stage of an economic integration process. Integration tends to make disappear the “boarder
eﬀects”, that are the measures intended to discriminate foreign goods and services relative to
domestic ones. There are several kinds of discriminations: tariﬀ barriers (as custom duties),
non-tariﬀ (quotas), or institutional (money). All these obstacles are found to hamper PPP.
Consequently, we consider three sub-periods that are in line with the diﬀerent steps of EMU
construction. The ﬁrst period, starting in January 1970, sticks with the Common Market
(established by the Rome Treaty in 1953) and ends in June 1987 with the implementation of
benchmark price level series.
8Previous to the application of cointegration tests, a battery of unit root tests have been applied showing
that all price series are integrated of order one. The detailed results are available upon request from the
authors. Note that Equation (8) does not include a deterministic trend, the latter being non signiﬁcant.
8Table 1: Cointegration tests results
1970.01-1987.06 1987.07-1998.12 1999.01-2011.07
p-value Half-life p-value Half-life p-value Half-life
Austria 0.0700* 48 0.0001*** 0.2 0.6677
Belgium 0.3824 0.2513 0.8373
Finland 0.7334 0.7609 0.1358
France 0.0661* 2 0.5410 0.3531
Greece 0.1180 0.5343 0.9717
Ireland 0.6870 0.5132 0.1236
Italy 0.3395 0.6533 0.1715
Luxembourg 0.3450 0.1222 0.7061
Netherlands 0.3198 0.3442 0.0969* 1.6
Portugal 0.1846 0.0402** 9.8 0.0050*** 12.5
Spain 0.3441 0.6428 0.0008*** 5.5
*** (resp. **, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (resp. 5%,
10%) signiﬁcance level. Half-lives are expressed in years. Source: Guerreiro and Mignon
(2011).
the Single Act. The latter deﬁnes the beginning of the second period, spanning from July 1987
to December 1998. The last period starts with the introduction of the euro in January 1999
and ends in July 2011. Those periods, which are distinguished here according to the integra-
tion process, are also characterized by diﬀerent exchange rate regimes: a “smooth” European
Monetary System (EMS) allowing some parity adjusments for the ﬁrst period; strengthening
of ﬁxed exchange rates within the EMS, with decreasing possibilities of parity adjustments
and the start of a nominal convergence process to meet Maastricht criteria and to enter in the
monetary union for the second period; introduction of the monetary union in the third period.
Results of cointegration tests are presented in Table 1 which displays the p-values relating
to the ADF-type test9 and the half-life of deviations (in years). With the exception of some
few special cases,10 PPP does not hold since the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration between domestic and German prices. These poor results and the absence of
obvious convergence may come from the well-known low power of time series unit root tests
9Johansen (1988, 1991)’s tests have also been applied, leading to the same conclusions.
10At the 1% signiﬁcance level, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for Portugal and Spain at
the end of the period, and for Austria during the second sub-period. Note however that half-lives for Portugal
and Spain are quite long, meaning that reversion to PPP, when it exists, takes a long time.
9against the stationary alternative in small samples. To overcome this limitation, we rely on
a panel framework. Adding the individual dimension to the analysis, the use of panel data
increases the power of unit root tests by raising the number of observations. Furthermore, this
approach allows us to consider both heterogeneity and cross dependence between Eurozone
countries.
3.2 Panel analysis
Historically, European countries have tied links for a long time, especially since the beginning
of economic integration initiated after World War II. In this context of integration, European
countries have shared common speciﬁcities—one of the tremendous example being the euro,
and all the domains of monetary policy. However, despite this apparent homogeneity, some
heterogeneity may persist due to distinct economic characteristics across members: European
construction has been done by steps, and it widens gradually incorporating new countries often
considered to be less integrated to Eurozone than the founding members. Therefore, some
countries known as peripheral members (like Portugal, Spain, or Greece) exhibit lower levels
of GDP per capita, prices, or productivity. Assuming that Germany is at the center of our
Eurozone conceptualization, we can, as Braudel (1985), divide EMU into three sub-samples
of countries:11
• the Core EMU, composed by Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands;
• the Northern periphery, including Ireland and Finland;
• the Southern periphery made by Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
We assess potential price convergence dynamics across each sub-group using panel data unit
root tests. To overcome the well-known problem of cross-sectional independence hypothesis
11An alternative classiﬁcation would have been to retain the distinction between core and peripheral coun-
tries, the latter group being composed by Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Our choosing classiﬁcation
presents the advantage of distinguishing between Northern and Southern non-core countries.
10among panel members (i.e. among the Eurozone countries), we apply second-generation panel
unit root tests that relax this restrictive assumption required by ﬁrst-generation tests.12,13
The Pesaran (2007) CIPS and the Choi (2002) tests are performed and the corresponding
results are reported in Table 2, both tests considering the unit root as the null hypothesis.14
The former test is based on Dickey–Fuller-type regressions augmented with the cross-section
averages of lagged levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the individual series. The later relies on an
error-components panel model and removes the cross-section dependence by eliminating (i)
individual eﬀects using the Elliott et al. (1996) methodology (ERS), and (ii) the time trend
eﬀect by centering on the individual mean.
Results are relatively mixed and dependent on the test considered. The CIPS and Choi’s tests
frequently lead to diﬀerent results. This diﬀerence may come from the way cross-sectional
dependence is accounted for. Both tests are based on the one common factor approach. How-
ever, while Choi’s test uses the orthogonalization procedure to deal with the cross-dependence
problem, the CIPS test uses augmented cross-section average and therefore does not eliminate
individual and time eﬀects. In addition, while both tests consider one common factor, only
the Choi’s test allows for heterogeneous speciﬁcation regarding the sensitivity of the factor,
which is particularly relevant in the Eurozone macroeconomic context. Paying thus a particu-
lar attention to the Choi’s approach, PPP relative to Germany is validated for both the whole
sample and the core EMU in the three sub-periods. PPP also holds for Southern periphery
during the ﬁrst two periods, but not after the launch of the euro. Regarding Northern periph-
ery, there are strong evidences that PPP is violated for each sub-period. On the whole, our
results put forward that price dynamics is heterogeneous between EMU members.
12See Hurlin and Mignon (2006) and Hurlin (2010) for a detailed presentation of panel unit root tests.
13Economically, cross-section dependence can arise for several reasons, such as socioeconomic interactions
and common factors. Cross correlation can also cause size distortions to ﬁrst-generation panel tests. The
cross-section dependence has been investigated using the CD test developed by Pesaran (2004) showing that
such correlations exist in our samples of countries (results are available upon request to the authors).
14Matlab codes (Version 7.00) provided by Christophe Hurlin are used to implement these second-generation
panel unit root tests (http://www.univ-orleans.fr/deg/masters/ESA/CH/churlin_R.htm).
11Table 2: Second-generation panel unit root tests (p-values)
Whole Core Northern Southern
sample Periphery Periphery
1970.01-1987.06
Speciﬁcation C C T+C C
CIPS 0.41 0.95 0.7 0.42
Choi
Pm 0*** 0*** 0.79 0***
Z 0*** 0*** 0.71 0.21
L∗ 0*** 0*** 0.69 0***
1987.07-1998.12
Speciﬁcation C C T+C C
CIPS 0.25 0.01*** 0.99 0.99
Choi
Pm 0*** 0*** 0.73 0.01***
Z 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.02**
L∗ 0*** 0*** 0.59 0.02**
1999.01-2011.07
Speciﬁcation C T+C T+C T+C
CIPS 0.84 0.5 0.99 0.24
Choi
Pm 0.01*** 0*** 0.7 0.85
Z 0.01*** 0*** 0.56 0.91
L∗ 0.01*** 0*** 0.55 0.9
* (resp **, ***): rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the 10%
(resp. 5%, 1%) signiﬁcance level. C (resp T+C) denotes model with
individual eﬀects (resp. individual eﬀects and time trends). (a) For
the CIPS test, all statistics are based on univariate AR(p) speciﬁca-
tions with p ≤ 8. (b) For the Choi’s test, the optimal lag orders in
the individual ERS statistics (Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock, 1996) for
each series are determined with p ≤ 8; under the null hypothesis the
Choi’s statistics are standard Normal when T and N converge jointly
to inﬁnity.
12Table 3: Pooled Mean Group estimates of the error-correction term and estimated half-lives
Whole Core Northern Southern
sample Periphery Periphery
1970.01-1987.06
φ -0.069 -0.063 No -0.112
Half-life 9.69 10.65 cointegration 5.83
1987.07-1998.12
φ -0.109 -0.157 No -0.067
Half-life 6 4.06 cointegration 9.99
1999.01-2011.07
φ -0.055 -0.067 No No
Half-life 12.25 9.99 cointegration cointegration
φ denotes the error-correction term estimated by the PMG method.
Half-lives are expressed in months.
To complement these ﬁndings, we estimate the half-life of deviations from PPP for sub-groups
as well as individual countries. To this end, we use the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran,
Smith and Shin (1999). This procedure consists in estimating a panel error correction model
where homogeneity accross members is imposed for the long-run relationship,15 while hetero-
geneity is allowed in the short-run dynamics and error correction mechanisms. It combines
two well-known procedures used in panel data: (i) the totally heterogeneous “mean group
estimate”, that consists in estimating separately N individuals regressions and averaging the
group speciﬁc coeﬃcients; and (ii) the homogeneous “pooled estimator”, in which only the
intercept is authorized to diﬀer across Eurozone members.
Tables 3 and 4 report the PMG estimates of the error-correction term and the corresponding
half lives. As shown in Table 3, the period corresponding to the implementation of the Single
Act is the one for which half lives are the smallest for the whole sample (about 6 months)
and for the Core EMU (about 4 months). This is in line with the literature arguing that
the Single Act has allowed to fully remove the remaining trade barriers (Engel and Rogers
(2004)). This may also be linked to the requirements of nominal convergence due to the entry
into the monetary union. The introduction of the euro, that was expected to accentuate this
15This hypothesis can be tested using an Hausman-type test.
13Table 4: Pooled Mean Group estimates of the error-correction term and estimated half-lives
Countries 1970.01-1987.06 1987.07-1998.12 1999.01-2011.07
Austria
φ -0.006 -0.37 -0.05
Half-life 115 1.5 13.51
Belgium
φ -0.08 -0.14 -0.01
Half-life 8.31 4.59 68.97
France
φ -0.13 -0.05 -0.15
Half-life 4.97 13.51 4.26
Italy
φ -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
Half-life 34.31 22.75 34.31
Luxembourg
φ -0.07 -0.19 -0.08
Half-life 9.55 3.29 8.31
Netherlands
φ -0.04 -0.13 -0.07
Half-life 16.38 4.98 9.55
Greece
φ -0.15 -0.08 No
Half-life 4.26 8.31 cointegration
Portugal
φ -0.11 -0.05 No
Half-life 5.95 13.51 cointegration
Spain
φ -0.07 -0.04 No
Half-life 9.55 16.98 cointegration
φ denotes the error-correction term estimated by the PMG method. Half-lives are expressed
in months.
14mechanism by improving market information, lowering trade costs and reducing uncertainty,
seems to have had little eﬀects, since half lives have increased (12 months for the entire sam-
ple, 10 for the Core EMU)—a ﬁnding that may be related to weaker ajustment mechanisms
within the monetary union. Turning to Southern periphery, half lives are very small in the
ﬁrst period (about 6 months), but increase in the second (10 months). This increase may be
obviously linked to the EMS crisis and, especially, to the huge nominal devaluation encoun-
tered by the Spanish and Portuguese currencies following the enlargement of the ﬂuctuation
margins within the monetary union.
Regarding individual countries (Table 4), heterogeneity across members is even more marked.
Inside the Core, and during the ﬁrst period, France exhibits the lowest half life, about 5
months, while it is about 34 months in Italy and 115 in Austria. During the second period,
the diﬀerences tend to diminish, but the launch of the euro triggered a raise of gaps. One
of the worrying result is the half life of Belgium in the third period, being about 68 months.
Such a value may indicate that this country is running out the cointegration path. Regarding
the Southern group, departures from PPP have increased between the ﬁrst and the second
period, but they are relatively homogeneous between countries.
4 Analysis and scope of the results
Our results put forward that price dynamics is not homogeneous (i) in time, and (ii) between
European countries. Here, we aim at identifying the reasons of this heterogeneity across
members, a fact that is highly relevant given that heterogeneity in price dynamics is at the
roots of the sovereign debt crisis that EMU is experiencing.
4.1 Heterogeneity of price dynamics as a consequence of structural eco-
nomic heterogeneity
One of the reasons explaining the diﬀerences in price dynamics is the Balassa-Samuelson
catching-up eﬀect, that entails an elevation of the aggregate price levels in the low-productivity
15Table 5: GDP PPP per capita relative to Germany in percent between 1970 and 2010
Countries 1970 1987 1998 2007 2010
Austria 94.12 99.95 102.8 107.2 105.8
Belgium 96.77 97.22 98.38 100.4 98.27
Finland 80.93 90.26 86.73 100.2 94.93
France 94.96 94.73 92.38 91.53 88.74
Greece 74.18 68.5 65.5 78.6 72.49
Ireland 62.09 65.74 98.55 122.9 107.65
Italy 86.08 92.9 91.14 86.11 80
Luxembourg 145.3 150.3 184.5 221.95 205
Netherlands 112.6 102.07 108.5 112.5 110.7
Portugal 52.98 57.62 68.01 65.84 64.86
Spain 74.92 74.21 80.03 85.39 80.6
Authors’ calculation on the basis of OECD data.
level countries. It can be considered as an asymmetric shock since the high-level productivity
countries are expected to experience price stability. One of the proxies often used to model
this phenomenon is the relative GDP PPP per capita.
Table 5 reports GDP PPP per capita relative to Germany. The 2007 value is shown to assess
the eﬀects of “subprimes” and hence “sovereign debt” crises. Regarding Southern Europe, the
situations are somewhat mixed. Portugal has markedly reduced the gap relative to Germany
before 1999, however it is not totally fulﬁlled and diﬀerences are still consequent. Moreover,
the reduction is deﬁnitely stopped after 1999 with the launch of the euro. Instead, Greece
seems to have experienced a catching-up after the implementation of the single currency. As
Portugal, the departure is not eliminated. Finally, Spain appears to have converged to Ger-
man GDP per capita all over the period. Balassa-Samuelson catching up is then a satisfactory
explanation for the PPP violation for Greece and Spain, but not for Portugal. Regarding
Northern periphery, the Balassa-Samuelson catching up is at play in Ireland and Finland for
the whole period. Turning to the Core, interesting insights stand out. GDPs per capita rel-
ative to Germany have been relatively stable between periods (unless Luxembourg, that can
be considered as an outlier), providing a general background for the results found in Section
3.2. The elevated half-lives obtained for Italy during all the periods can be explained by the
16size of the GDP gap (that is relatively higher than for the other countries belonging to the
Core) relative to Germany.
Nonetheless, Balassa-Samuelson catching up is not the unique reason of asymmetric shock
appearance. The nominal exchange rate level relative to the rest of the world can also con-
stitute a factor that can lead to divergences in price dynamics. In other words, can EMU
members compete with low wage countries with a strong currency if they are specialized in
low technology products? Since the competitiveness of these products is highly sensitive to
costs, members specialized in low technology have to pressure downward their wages, and
also their price to recover competitiveness relative to low wage countries. Members that are
specialized in high technology do not experience these constraints since their products are less
sensitive to costs. Two diﬀerent price dynamics are then at play: one pressured downward,
the other unconstrained. Since the wages are not likely to decrease, members specialized in
low technology will face a dramatic loss of competitiveness if they do not go up market.
We try to control for that eﬀect by constructing a simple index of technological specialization
on the basis of the revealed comparative advantages for the CITI manufacturing indicator (see
Appendix for the construction of the index). Table 6 reports the technological specialization
for each country during the periods 1987-1998 and 1999-2009. Four categories of countries
can be distinguished:
• Our benchmark country, Germany is specialized in industries with high technological
contents: its products are innovative, or positioned on the high quality segment, which
allows it to discriminate its prices.
• Austria, Finland, France, and the Netherlands own at equal shares high and medium
technology industries. They have a lower market power than Germany, even if it remains
substantial.
• Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Spain are mainly specialized in medium-technology sectors,
and have very few high-tech industries. Moreover, low-technology sectors represent an
17Table 6: Technological specialization in 1987-1998 and 1999-2009
Specialization
Period 87-98 99-09
Austria high technology high technology
Belgium medium technology medium technology
Finland high technology high technology
France high technology high technology
Germany superior technology superior technology
Greece low technology low technology
Ireland medium technology medium technology
Italy medium technology medium technology
Luxembourg NA NA
Netherlands high technology high technology
Portugal low technology low technology
Spain medium technology medium technology
Source : OCDE. NA : non available.
important part of specialization in Spain and Italy.
• Greece and Portugal are mostly specialized in low-technology industries, facing a strong
competition in prices.
The heterogeneity of specialization supplemented by rigidities in wage decrease, may explain
the non-convergence of Southern countries, especially Portugal, and also the elevated half-lives
of Belgium and Italy: without the possibility of decreasing wages (and hence prices), a strong
currency induces a loss of competitiveness that translates into imbalances in goods markets,
and ﬁnally a violation of PPP.
4.2 Scope of the results
To our best knowledge, with the exception of Cecchetti et al. (2002), no study exists on the
PPP deviation inside a monetary area. Cecchetti et al. (2002) have tested price index conver-
gence among US cities using ﬁrst generation panel unit root tests. Comparing our results with
theirs may be interesting because the US is a long-lived monetary area, with strong political
links and where economic integration is entire. Although Cecchetti et al. (2002) ﬁnd, as we
do, price convergence between US cities (i.e. validation of the PPP hypothesis), their half-lives
18are far higher than ours. They are comprised between eight and nine years for their whole
sample (19 cities on the 1918 to 1995 period), and about eight years for the more recent period
(1976-1995). Such results would mean that EMU is more integrated than the US, which is
unlikely. The more plausible explanation lies in the data used as well as the econometric tech-
niques that have been implemented. Cecchetti et al. (2002) consider price indexes instead of
price levels, which is not appropriate for testing absolute PPP. Moreover, ﬁrst generation panel
unit root tests may have been too restrictive to assess price convergence since they assume ho-
mogeneity between members, an hypothesis that is not veriﬁed as seen in the previous section.
The recent literature on OCA has mainly devoted attention to cyclical rather than structural
homogeneity of the countries considered. On one hand, an empirical strand tried to assess the
correlation of business cycles and the symmetry of shocks through VARs (see Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1992, 1996) among others). On the other hand, a theoretical strand focused on
the means of rendering business cycles and shocks more symmetric (the endogenous criteria
literature, pioneered by Frankel and Rose (1998)). Our approach revives the pioneering phase
of OCA literature (Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969)) that emphasized
on the structural similarities of currency union members, and stresses that these criteria may
be the most important to achieved the optimality, or at least the viability, of a monetary
union. Following Juselius (1995), linking PPP (goods market) and uncovered interest parity
(capital market) conditions, it is possible to understand through price dynamics why structural
heterogeneity among members of a currency union is a problem. In the absence of trade
barriers as well as exchange rate adjustments, a violation of PPP (such a Balassa-Samuelson
catching-up, but not only) leads immediately to goods market imbalances (trade deﬁcits) that
have to be compensated by capital inﬂows. This creates asymmetric debt emissions between
members that results in ﬁne (through long interest rates and default probability diﬀerentials)
in sovereign debt crisis from part of the members. This mechanism seems to ﬁt the troubles
EMU is experiencing.
195 Conclusion
This paper aims at investigating whether price dynamics is homogeneous across the Eurozone
countries. This question if of particular interest in the current debt crisis context, since
heterogeneity in price dynamics may be one of the causes of the turmoil. Relying on monthly
data over the January 1970-July 2011 period, we test for the absolute purchasing power
parity (PPP) hypothesis through the implementation of second-generation panel unit root
and cointegration tests. Our results show that price dynamics is heterogeneous depending on
both the time period and the considered group of countries. More speciﬁcally, while PPP is
validated for the core EMU countries, this hypothesis does not hold for Northern peripheral
countries such as Ireland and Finland which experienced a Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. Turning
to the Southern countries, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain, PPP is observed only before
the launch of the euro. This violation of the PPP on the recent period may be explained
by a catching-up phenomenon, as well as the countries’ technological specialization pattern.
Our ﬁndings of heterogeneous price dynamics may be viewed as one the possible causes of
the current debt crisis and contribute to the debate relative to the viability of the monetary
union.
Appendix
The deﬁnition of the technological specialization is based on the revealed comparative advan-
tages for trade micro-indicators in the manufacturing category (CITI database, available on
OECD). Table 7 reports the sector associated to each number.
On the basis of the analysis of these indexes at a disaggregated level, we consider the following
typology:
• Specialization in low technology sectors: indexes 15 to 21.
• Specialization in medium technology sectors: indexes 22 to 28 and 36.
• Specialization in high technology sectors: indexes 29 to 35.
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21Table 7: Deﬁnition of CITI indexes
Index Deﬁnition
15 food products and beverages
16 tobacco products
17 textiles
18 wearing apparel ; dressing and dyeing of fur
19 dressing of leather ; luggage
20 woods and products of wood and cork (except furnitures)
21 paper and paper products
22 publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
23 coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24 chemical products
25 rubber and plastic products
26 non metallic mineral products
27 basic metals
28 fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipments)
29 machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery
31 electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 radio and television communication equipment
33 medical, precision and optical instruments
34 motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 other transport equipment
36 furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.
Source : CITI, OECD.
Note that index 23 has a high technology industry, that of nuclear, in which only France
is specialized. Accordingly, we consider that for France index 23 testiﬁes a high technology
specialization. In Table 8, we report for the two sub-periods the sectors in which countries
are specialized.
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